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ON THE ROAD TO EDUCATIONAL FAILURE:
A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO TRACKING
by Em Hall

Prologue: Everything taught in the schools isn 't listed in the
curriculum guide. Schools teach ( or claim to teach) every
child how to read, to write, to add, subtract, multiply, and
divide, and to use these tools to develop other practical,
intellectual and social skills. But the schools also teach
children their place.
Indeed, the schools' major social function can be
seen as that of allocating human resources for the larger
society, assuring that there will not only be a sufficient
number of men of knowledge and learning, but also a
sufficient number of hewers of wood and drawers of water.
While schools are organized to provide this service, there is
more to life in society than work and education could and
should be organized to service this wider range of values.
Tracking, using the term in the broader sense to
include all ability . grouping, represents a solution to an
insoluble dilemma . While individualized instruction has long
been touted as the great desideratum in American education,
no one has ever been willing to pay what it would cost to give
each child a different education. Educators thus devised what
they considered to be the-next best thing , educational units
large enough to be economically viable but small enough to
isolate students with what were thought to be roughly
similar educational needs. These needs are determined by
an unformulated formula employing "objective testing,"
classroom achievement, and teacher recommendations. The
effect of a particular child's background on performance on
these measures is rarely considered.
Though the system was devised to effect educational opportunity for all children, in practice the process
has cumulative and severely limiting effects. 1 At every
point on the institutional path, educators select certain
criteria (and in effect ignore others) as indices of educational need. Having determined need , they then provide
differentiated programs on the basis of these needs and
group children accordingly. A decision at one point in time
limits the range of alternatives available at the next. More
often than not, slow readers in the first grade graduate as

slow shop students from high school, while children who
were judged quick in elementary school are those who end
up taking college-level courses in their senior year of high
school. More often than not , the social class and race of the
child involved appear to have as much to do with their
placement as anything else. Class and race influence the
teacher's expectations and assessments, they affect classroom achievement (particularly when classes are themselves
segregated by race or social class), and they appear to affect
performance on placement tests as well. Schools cannot
continue to program in this way for relative failure and still
claim to function as equalizing agencies. These grouping
programs, for whatever reasons, tend to harden the race and
class lines drawn in the larger society. They are structurally
incapable of offering equality of educational opportunity
to those groups who have had it least and need it most.
The educational mechanisms producing these results come in a variety of forms . Grouping takes place
within classrooms and between them. It appears in the offer
of broad curriculum programs in the same high school. It
distinguishes populations of entire buildings; many cities
track by schools, as in "Tech High" and "Latin." Resources
allocated to the resulting units vary along every descriptive
axis: different textbooks; different kinds and qualities and
even numbers of teachers; different capital investment
patterns; different kinds and qualities and numbers of
children. At the same level, programs in different units can
vary in content, emphasis, and speed of presentation .
Principles of unit assignment can also differ; sometimes
only "objective" measures such as intelligence tests are
used; more often the more subjective measures such as
teacher recommendations and grades are also employed.
Nominally and superficially , every local school system
differentiates its programs and children differently. Thus, in
examining systems, it would be well for the observer not to
permit himself to be distracted by differences in terminology, but rather to keep in mind the essential characteristics of the system.

Despite their myriad forms, these systems share a
common theoretical underpinning and historical genesis.2
Furthermore, only four characteristics are critical to analysis of any system at any level where grouping is done on
the basis of ability .3 First , the inclusiveness of a grouping
scheme determines how many subsequent opportunities at
any given educational level remain open to the classified
individual. The test of inclusiveness is the extent to which
grouping limits or expands future choices or development.
In the most inclusive schemes, all children placed in the
lowest first grade classification will end up nine years later
in the lowest high school track. The second common
characteristic is electivity, or the degree to which a child's
placement reflects his (or his parents') choice. Third is
selectivity, which comprises the nature of the chosen
"index of ability" or "learning capacity" and consequently
the type and degree of unit homogeneity resulting from the
selection process. Finally, there is what can be called the
scheme's comprehensiveness, which is a measure of how
complete and how long lasting is the effect of any
particular classification decision on the individual student.
Four Characteristics
Each of these characteristics translates painlessly
into matters of constitutional concern and statistical debate. If the duty of equal protection is read as an obligation
to provide "equal opportunity ," then the focus of constitutional interest in the system's inclusiveness falls on its
limiting or liberating effects over time . A low first-grade
ability group that is genuinely compensatory in nature and
has the effect of improving achievement, thereby increasing
student options at the next allocation stage, will attract
more legal sympathy than one which tends to lock students
into a pattern of declining performance, thereby constricting later alternatives. Longitudinal data, following the
pattern of grouping decisions in the educational lives of
particular children, has never been gathered, but would go a
long way in establishing whether early classification decisions tend to be self-fulfilling at later stages of the process.
The limited descriptive studies available bear out this
widespread belief, but their evidence is as yet merely
suggestive and not conclusive .4
Electivity raises more difficult equal protection
issues to which I return later. It suffices to say here that
many free-choice plans leave less to initiative and freedom
(which would absolve the state of responsibility for any
imposed classification) than to overt or subtle forms of
social and educational discrimination. Most school systems,
for example, allow entering high-school students a fairly
free choice of three basic curriculums : college, general, or
vocational. But the student comes to that decision with the
collected residue of nine years of previous schooling which
will have an obvious and often determinative effect on the
options realistically and psychologically available to him.
And recent administrative studies have found that support
services designed to aid in the exercise of what is left of
that free-choice function more to reinforce early school
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decisions about the student's prospects than they do to
expand his alternatives. 5
Analysis of a plan's selectivity goes to the heart of
a different and more direct constitutional requirement :
rationality in the means chosen to a legitimate end. A
system whose "classifying fact" 6 or ordering criterion
relates to ability, for example, must as a minimum include a
rational procedure for measuring ability and making judgments accordingly. In equal protection terms of justifying
its different treatment of individuals and groups, the state
may be required to demonstrate rationality in the plan's
implementation as a prerequisite to approval of its substance. Enter the maze of contradictory evidence about the
fairness of intelligence tests and the growing data suggesting
that even if the tests are fair, their use as a decision-making
tool is not. Any plan which either fails to measure ability
accurately or to make even-handed grouping decisions
accordingly has lost most of its purpose and justification.
That possibility will prove greatest where the
effect of the classification decision is most comprehensive.
A grouping assignment permanent in time, encompassing in
curriculum, and unchanging in class composition may encounter more serious constitutional objections than a plan
whose consequences are more limited. The degree of pupil
mixing in different classes or subjects , the flexibility for
purposes of transfer and promotion, and the provision of
ongoing evaluation of assignment decisions will prove preeminent factors in any constitutional analysis of the scope
and rigidity of a grouping plan.
But does it work?
The justification of even the most flexible plan
may also disappear if it meets all of these mechanical tests
and simply does not work, even on its own terms . The
rationale for institution of plans like ability grouping relies
heavily on the proposition that students in tracked systems
increase their capacity to learn (and their educational
achievement) as a consequence of the differentiated programs to which they are assigned. Legal and educational
issues converge in the controversy centered around the
question of whether ability grouping leads to greater educational achievement by any or all of the group of children
affected.
Studies in this area are as numerous as they are
inconclusive; grouping research tries hard to make up in
bulk what it lacks in hard findings. 7 Many of the most
recent reports with more sophisticated methodology focus
on comparisons of groups of similar students, half assigned
randomly to classrooms and half sent to classes of students
of similar ability. The problem posed: Do children grouped
homogenously achieve better over a given limited period of
.time-usually not more than two years- than children who
are grouped heterogenously, all other things being equal.
Answer: Usually not. Further, there is some evidence that
while homogenous grouping has no particular effect on
children of high or middle ability, it measurably adds to the
disadvantage of children of low ability. At the least , the

research has never validated the educational rationale of
grouping, that everyone benefits.
Recent critics of the major studies have argued
that the results are inconclusive, either because the situation is ambiguous, or more likely, because their operating
assumptions are unsophisticated. 8 Most studies make the
simplifying assumption that there is a direct link between
the structure of the unit and its member's achievement,
ignoring the possibility that the mere fact of being in a low
track may have more meaning than whatever measure was
used to place the child in a particular track.
The now-famous "Pygmalion effect" adds a
psychological dimension to the structural one. In this
experiment, children were given tests and teachers were
informed that certain children would do well and that
others would do poorly. This, in fact, proved to be the case,
even though the good and poor risks had been chqsen at
random; only the teacher's expectations have been
changed. 9 A reanalysis of the Coleman Report data indicates that classroom race and class composition has a more
important effect on student achievement than school race
and class composition .1 0 So long as grouping is carried on
according to the current standard operating procedures,
most integrated schools will be segregated by classroom as a
result of purportedly neutral selection processes. These
selection processes, however, have a strong negative influence on achievement. At this point, debates about the
validity of the Coleman data and the precise holding in
Brown and its progeny will be narrowed to an investigation
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of the composition of particular classrooms.
These findings are all partial and suggestive; no one
has yet added together all that is known. But the picture
that might emerge is almost sure to show what has always
been supposed, that all the different problems isolated by
these studies converge on a single social (and racial) class,
with local variations. Those harmed in the various ways the
studies describe turn out to be the poor, the black (or
Latin, or Indians, or migrant children) and in general those
for whom educational success is a matter of survival rather
than of supplementation of what they otherwise come by
at home. If this convergence at the bottom in fact occurs,
then grouping becomes more than an educational practice
of undemonstrated worth. It becomes a mechanism through
which judicially favored classes, the poor and members of
racial and ethnic minorities, are being denied equal access
to an education, a government service that is gradually
gaining status as a fundamental right. 11
Institutional Mismatch
On precisely such grounds, Judge Skelly Wright
enjoined the operation of the Washington, D.C., tracking
system, going further than any other judicial approach to
grouping. 1 2 The court first gathered a huge amount of data
on the mechanics of the four-track scheme devised and
operated by then Superintendent of Schools Carl Hansen,
noting the great scope, rigidity, and inclusiveness of its
operation. Of particular interest to the court was the
system's comprehensiveness, the way in which assignment
to a track often proved to be inflexible and of long
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duration.
Race and class data established a high correlation
between track assignment and the background of the
affected child. Wright went on to rule that when stateimposed classifications dealing with critical personal rightsas he ruled ed.ucation to be-operated in a way that placed
the heaviest burdens on the poor and culturally disadvantaged-as assignment to lower tracks seemed to-then the
state had to come forward and show a compelling reason
for proceeding as they did.
When Washington school officials offered the results of standard aptitude tests as the reason for their
grouping practices, Wright ruled those results meaningless,
measuring nothing more than the background from which
the students came. 13 Since the classifying criteria had
nothing to do with relative abilities to learn black and poor
children assigned to lower ability groups where less education was offere d or expected than in higher ones, were
being systematically undereducated.
Hobsen thus represents a successful attack on the
selective mechanism used in the Washington tracking plan,
not a frontal assault on the idea of differentiated services
for students with differing educational needs. Wright enjoined the operation of the system not because of its
theoretical purpose but because there was no constitutionally legitimate way to match different students to
programs offering them greater or lesser amounts of education. Neither the judge nor the plaintiffs insisted that all
grouping schemes were impermissible . But without its
testing program school administrators could not justify
assignment of some children to fast classes and others to
slow ones.

The Quest for a Remedy
Heterogenous grouping would have been the inevitable-though unintended-result if the circuit court of
appeals had not worked the miracle of affirming Wright's
district court order and at the same time cutting the
substance out of his tracking decree . While upholding his
rulings on Washington's ·tracking scheme, it limited their
applicability to the system as it operated up to 1968. Local
school officials could continue to track on the basis of a
testing program, but they could not do so if the new system
bore too close a programmatic resemblance to the system
Wright had ordered stopped . This hurdle was leaped with
alacrity (and very little difficulty). Washington schools
continue to track as usual, but with different lines on the
chart and different labels on all the little boxes.
Education in Washington is no better than it was,
but it is doubtful that the alternative implicitly settled on
by Wright would have improved the situation much. Treating all children alike in the services delivered to them has
never been thought the apogee of effective education .
Random grouping in any urban system produces such a
wide range of ability differences within each class that
teachers are obliged either to pay no attention to some
4 / INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION

children or to sub-divide the class according to her own
perceptions of the children's differing needs, thus reproducing in classroom miniature the problems raised by
school-wide grouping.
In the classroom, the lowest level of school organization, no traditional legal solution for possible grouping abuses can offer much help for sensitive and fundamen tal change. Granting the wisdom of the "new" equal
protection approach Wright used to reach the result he did
(which many courts and commentators refuse to do 14 ) , the
problem with his implicit remedy of equal services was that
it was no remedy at all. No alternative , short of abandonment of the idea of different services fo r different children ,
followed from the Hobson opinion.
What did emerge, however , were some negative
standards, which suggests that courts may play an important function in circumscribing grouping options available to school administrators who feel that it is educationally necessary to make some kinds of distinctions
between children . If Hobson did not say what would work,
it did indicate what couldn't even be tried , namely grouping
plans which tend to isolate poor and black children in lower
tracks institutionally designed to offer less education than
that given other groups in the same school system. Where
such plans are tried, courts will presumably continue to give
the wide latitude normally given to administrative actions,
but will also require them to give some greater demonstration of the necessity of proceeding as they wish to, a
demonstration of worth sufficiently compelling to overcome the harm worked by the systematic undereducation
of the socially and racially segregated under track. Such a
demonstration is hard to imagine.
Court involvement deeper than this may be foreclosed by the nature of judicial interventions themselves.
The flexibility of a fluidly designed system which met
individual needs and reflected individual preferences could
only be hampered by a court ruling, necessarily prescriptive
and rigid. Many of the most important ways in which
children are harmfully classified are found either within the
single classroom or occur as the result of other non-specific
institutional arrangements, such as neighborhood schools. A
court-imposed remedy is particularly unsuited to reach
practices within classrooms involving thousands of possible
forms and relating to the most sensitive human situations.
How do you order a teacher to expect more from his
students? Would he obey? How would you know if he
hadn't?
Changing the Rules
Beyond the institutional mismatch between a
court of law and a set of infinitely variable classrooms,
there is a fu rther deeper problem with the thrust of equal
protection approaches to differential educational services.
It is the same problem that promises to make most of the
tracking research irrelevant before it produces any hard
results. Both equal protection and statistical analysis must

accept the most fundamental operating assumptions of
grouping schemes before either can apply whatever angle of
vision is deemed relevant-be it resource input, educational
output, or discriminatory individual level effects-to test
the system's relative impact on different student groups.
That is to say, the educational battle is lost from
either the statistical or Fourteenth Amendment viewpoint
before the logical war is begun. On a practical level,
acceptance of the premises of the argument for ability
grouping-that some children can absorb more education
than others-leaves no room for proof to the contrary; the
system is structured in a way to guarantee that result, no
matter what the validity of the initial determination. On a
theoretical level, both the statistician and the equal protectionist tend to focus their attention on the points of
commonality between tracks for it is at these points that
inequalities are most obvious. A change of focus to the
principles around which the differentiations are built may
be revealing. The emphasis on comparisons between programs can yield only a reduction in their differences. An

emphasis on principles yields the insight that what the
situation really demands is more differences, not just differences in quantity, but differences in approach, in measure
of achievement, in the very definition of education. The
failure to consider a broader range of alternatives in the
principles on which differential programs are devised makes
it highly improbable that any inquiry-judicial, scientific, or
otherwise-will yield a better, more complete, and less
restrictive way of organizing sub-units.
Differential educational services within particular
schools raise educational problems not because they are too
different in quantity, but because they do not differ
enough in quality . No one seriously doubts that diverse
student populations "need" varied educational services.
What is being questioned here is the notion that if one
portion of geography is desirable for average students, then
it follows that slow students should receive three-quarters
of a portion while fast students should have one-and-aquarter portions. But this is what will happen so long as
variations in services are controlled by single institutions
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The major function of schools can be seen as that of allocating human resources for the larger society.

s

and guided by single, restrictively narrow achievement
standards. The inevitable yield is differences in children
ranging only fro m better to worse, from smart to dumb,
from more educated to less educated.
Real differences in real children are far richer than
the narrow range of skills that aptitude tests tap , far more
varied than grouping on that basis can allow, and much
more neutral with respect to the values one can legitimately
attach to them than current school classification systems
can structurally admit.
Others have approached the organizational implications of this issue implicitly in arguments advanced for
the concept of resource specificity, the idea that different
children need different resources to achieve the same
educational ends. 1 5 If this is true, then current grouping
schemes are self-defeating and discriminatory .
Simplistically, children (and, at least in the early
years, their parents) would be encouraged either to form
their own educational units within their schools or to select
others that were offered to them. Each child would bring to
that unit a per capita entitlement which would be aggregated in that unit and expressed as the total dollar resources
available to it. Compensatory funds would follow compensatory children. Advocate planners would provide compensatory political services to parents and children unaccustomed to manipulating the school environment to
their own advantage. The sub-units thus formed would then
bargain with the central school administrator for the services they thought most appropriate to themselves. The
process would culminate in a contract between the school
and the sub-group describing the resources to be assigned
and specifying the educational program to be pursued with
them. In this context, the usual voucher system emerges as
nothing more than an idiosyncratic method of bookkeeping
which gives only purchasing power without granting the
power of enforcement.
The scheme is not as far-fetched as it first appears .
Some schools in the north have begun to develop attenuated forms of it already in that sub -u nits within them have
been constructed around divergent educational principles .
It involves a radical decentralization of the power to
differentiate but alters neither the basic economics or
structure of a single public school. It merely penetrates the
heretofore monadic classroom. Consider the single classroom + teacher as a school district for the purpose of
delivering services. As a core unit which can be expanded or
contracted as dictated by the program pursued the classroom as presently constituted is large enough to be
economically independent. Teacher salaries consume 80 to
90 per cent of the instructional budget in most systems.
Since capital investment patterns are affected not at all, for
more than 90 per cent of its activities there will be no
savings to the system as a whole in marrying one sub -unit to
others. And the classroom has a special integrity as a
control unit since most of the activities which make critical
educational differences occur there.
In this system, academic achievement is relegated

to the status of only one of many possible educational
goals. Thus, the notion of relevant differences again expands and the points of relevant comparison further contract. Educational units which are the beneficiaries of
resource specificity and which have the ability to vary their
choice of resources on the basis of divergent goals will soon
become as different as the proverbial apples and pears . But
the range of differences in children is at least that great and
so is the range of their preferences.
Equality would not become irrelevant or disappear
from a system of sub-units pursuing wildly different aims
by wildly different means. The focus for discerning equality
would simply shift away from the substance of educational
resources to the power to purchase them, away from the
output of the unit and towards the fairness of the process .
What can be done now?
The problems posed by differentiated educations
for different children are political problems and tracking is
a political solution. So too is the system suggested here. 16
It is not a system that will commend itself, to say the least,
to either school personnel as an immediately worthwhile
structural reform or to judges as a court-imposed remedy to
specific institutional abuses in tracking schemes. But while
waiting for this revolution in American education, lawyers
can play a critical role in breaking down the current school
practices which allow and even cause the abuses in current
tracking schemes.
First, lawyers can police current grouping practices
on their own terms, making sure that they operate in ways
that are true to their own declared intentions and prin ciples , thus building badly needed accountability into an
allocation system that has never allowed for it. By acting as
surrogates for power that may someday devolve on the
sub-units actually affected, lawyers can serve worthwhile
notice on school administrators that the power to control
the amount of education a child will be exposed to is not
absolute. Arbitrary and sometimes punitive shifts in group ing assignments have definite legal implications. Children
having nothing more than a personality conflict with their
teacher are demoted to groups where provision of less
education is expected to resolve that conflict, as though a
disagreement with a teacher constituted resistance to being
educated . Information about the way particular school
systems make grouping decisions is rarely available to the
public. Indeed, parents are rarely aware that the system is
organized to provide more education to some children than
to others; nor are they aware that their own children have
been subject to such decisions; they are not aware because
the system has made no effort to inform them. Such
decisions are of critical interest to parents and children; if
·the school system chooses to channel children in these
ways, then, at the very least, it should be required to make
the process as open as possible. Lawyers can assert that
right for parents and so begin to establish communication
between the school and the parents while exposing one
critical aspect of education to the light.
~

6/ INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION

topage27

...,..frompage6
Lawyers can also move against those differentiating principles, such as aptitude tests, which inform the
allocation process and without which compulsory tracking
assignments could not be legitimated. Suits challenging the
fairness of tests are both time-consuming and complex. If
recent attempts at attacking tests are any indication, there
is little guarantee of successful judicial resolution of the
complex legal issues they raise. But nothing else so chills
the cockles of an administrator's heart as an attack on those
tools which allow him to mete out different amounts of

education to different children while at the same time
absolving him of any personal responsibility for the decision. And nothing else so triggers the most deep-seated
educational fears of black and poor families as a test (or,
revealingly, a "battery of tests") which they certainly never.
made and about which they have been told next to nothing.
A successful legal attack on either the grouping
system as administered or the grouping system as conceived
will not yield and educationally appropriate remedy. But it
will not create a vacuum. More room to maneuver means
more room for critically needed reform.
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